ACSS

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

LEADERSHIP SEMINAR

GABORONE, BOTSWANA 3-14 July 2000



END-OF-SEMINAR ACADEMIC SUMMARY

ENGLISH

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The Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The faculty and staff of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies and its parent organizations in the

Department of Defense subscribe to the following principles:

MISSION

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies supports democratic governance in Africa by offering senior African civilian and military leaders a rigorous academic and practical program in civil-military relations, national security strategy, and defense economics. To this end, the ACSS presents a substantive academic experience designed to:

- Promote, at the Center, informed and productive inquiry on the military's role in a democracy among military officers, government officials, and non-government civilian leaders;
 - Assess the importance of civilian control and military professionalism in democratic processes;
 - Examine the civilian-military interface in formulating and executing national security strategy;
 - Explore efficient, transparent resource allocation processes that meet national security challenges.
- Foster, within participant countries, an understanding of the military's role that is shaped and shared by the people, their governments, and their militaries;
- Maintain long-term, continuing interaction with and among participants on matters relevant to the Center's mission; and,
- Support additional research, seminars, conferences, and other exchange activities on relevant topics in Africa, Europe, and the United States.

CORE VALUES

- **EXCELLENCE IN TEACHING, RESEARCH AND OUTREACH...** Fostering an open, creative and stimulating environment for learning.
- ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY... Providing the climate to express and pursue ideas, opinions, and issues relevant to the Center's mission and vision, free of undue limitations, restraints, hidden agendas or coercion by the organization or external environment; accomplishing institutional learning objectives in an intellectually and academically responsible manner; critiquing ideas, not people.
- **NONATTRIBUTION...** Providing faculty, guests, and participants the opportunity to express ideas and discuss issues without fear of external critique and being quoted by name.
- **DIVERSITY OF THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE...** Sustaining an environment characterized by diversity of thought, open inquiry, intellectual honesty, and responsibility.
- **INTELLECTUAL RIGOR...** Executing quality teaching, learning and research processes that meet the highest standards of academe and developing the participants' sense of intellectual duty that will continue beyond the resident seminar.
- **RESPECT FOR OTHERS...** Fostering an environment in which all are treated with dignity and without discrimination; acting in a collegial manner; seeking first to understand, then to be understood.
- **ETHICAL CONDUCT...** Doing what is right; placing principle first; exercising integrity in programs and practice.
- **TEAMWORK**... Working together to create knowledge, to develop relevant disciplines of study, and to build the Center.
 - **SERVICE...** Contributing to the African, European, and American communities.

Foreword

From 3 July to 14 July 2000, 111 civilian and military officials from Africa, Europe, and the United States took part in the inaugural Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) Leadership Seminar in Gaborone, Botswana.

In an open learning environment, where the principles of academic freedom and nonattribution were respected and encouraged, participants discussed ways in which democratic societies:

- define the roles and missions of their militaries, and exercise democratic civilian control over them;
- define their national interests, and develop and implement security strategies;
- organize and utilize their national resources to maintain national security and serve the needs of their citizens; and
- interact with civil society, NGOs and regional organizations to define appropriate roles for security establishments.

The program concluded with a Capstone Exercise in which participants worked cooperatively in teams to address these issues in a simulated, but realistic scenario. Each participant applied principles presented during discussion groups.

Participants represented forty-one African nations, five European nations, the United States, and several regional and non-governmental organizations. Participants were taken from their countries' ministries of defense, ministries of foreign affairs, offices of the President, and offices of the Prime Minister. Ten participants were women.

The facilitators represented the best and brightest that Africa, Europe, and the United States have to offer. There was a total of sixteen faculty members who came from academia, the military, and civil society. There were also eight rapporteurs who provided daily summaries of each group discussion. Four of the rapporteurs were Colonels from the Botswana Defense Force, one was a senior supervisor in the Botswana Police Force, one was a professor from the University of Botswana, and the other two rapporteurs were second-year graduate students from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

The Leadership Seminar was planned and implemented in full partnership with the government of Botswana, which assumed responsibility for a number of key areas, including security, protocol, and the management of extracurricular activities. Several other partners made substantial contributions. The Government of France has assigned a full-time faculty member who has made considerable contributions to the curriculum.

The Honorable Madame Tebelelo Seretse, Botswana's Acting Prime Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration, opened the Leadership Seminar. US Ambassador to Botswana John Lange was present for several discussions and was the featured speaker at the closing ceremony. US Congressman Donald M. Payne (D-New Jersey), Member, ACSS Board of Visitors, was a featured visitor for several days during the Seminar.

Other guest speakers/presenters/visitors included:

General Amadou Toumané Touré, former President of Mali

Mrs. Tuelonyaana Oliphant, Office of the President of Botswana

Commissioner Norman S. Melboge, Botswana's Police Commissioner

Ms. Lucy Dlamini, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense, Swaziland

Mr. Thomas Callahan, Majority Staffer, US House of Representatives International Relations Committee

LTG Louis Fisher, Commander, Botswana Defense Force

GEN (Retired, US Air Force) James L. Jamerson, Member, ACSS Board of Visitors

MG (Retired, France) Alain Faupin, Professor, College of International Security Studies, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Brigadier General Richard B. Bundy, Vice Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J7, The Joint Staff, The Pentagon

Dr. (LTC) Freda Sakala Kazembe, Maina Soko Military Hospital, Lusaka, Zambia

CPT Stephen Talugende, Administrative Officer, Medical Services, Joint Clinical Research Center, Uganda Peoples Defense Force

Professor Peter Batchelor, Director, Small Arms Project, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland

Professor Gavin Cawthra, Chair, Defence and Security Management, Graduate School of Public and Development Management, University of the Witswatersrand

Professor Chris Fomunyoh, Regional Director for West, Central, East Africa, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs; Adjunct faculty member for the Leadership Seminar

Professor Connie Freeman, Department Chair, Defense Economics, ACSS

Professor Grant Hammond, Director, Center for Strategy and Technology, U.S. Air War College

Professor Eboe Hutchful, Wayne State University (Detroit) and African Security Dialogue and Research Center (Ghana)

Professor Ibrahim Wani, Senior African Representative and Department Chair for Civil-Military Relations, ACSS

Professor Claude Welch, Department of Political Science, State University of New York at Buffalo; Adjunct faculty member for the Leadership Seminar

Professor Rocky Williams, Institute for Security Studies, Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa

Ms. Sinah Chaba, Department of Public Health, Botswana

Ms. Assaita De, Executive Director, African Institute for Democracy, Senegal

Ms. Clarissa Kayosa, US Campaign to Ban Landmines Steering Committee

Mrs. Mariam Maiga, President, MNFPUN, Mali

Professor Kwezi Mngquibisa, ACCORD, Republic of South Africa

Ms. Alice Mogwe, Director, Center for Human Rights, Botswana

Mr. Ngande Mwanajiti, Executive Director, AFRONET, Zambia

Mr. Edetaen Ojo, Executive Director, Media Rights Agenda, Nigeria

Mr. Abdul Oroh, Executive Director, Civil Liberties Organization, Nigeria

. . . and Dr. Nancy J. Walker, Director of the ACSS, who presided over key events.

	Seminar
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	Academic Schedule for Gaborone Leadership Seminar
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Saturday 8 July	(Lunch)	Presentation	Saturday 15 July Faculty Hotwash	
Friday 7 July	17: Strategizing for Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution in Africa (Panel) [Mngquibisa, Maiga, Faupin, Makhubu] 18: Making Security Strategy: The Tools and the Actors (Discussion Groups) (Lunch) 19: Defining Roles and Missions for the Security Services in Democratic States (Discussion Groups)	After Session 19/Before Dinner: Civil Society, National Security, and the Military (Roundtable)[Oroh, Mogwe, Boureima, Baricako] *: Issue Canstone to all	Friday 14 July 33: Capstone Exercise: Group Presentations (Plenary) [Dean] 34: Director's Course Summary (Plenary) (Plenary) 35: End-of-Seminar Academic Evaluations; Course Wrap-up (Discussion Groups) (Lunch) Graduation/Closing Ceremony Director's Farewell Dinner/Reception	(FRENCH HOLIDAY)
Thursday 6 July	13: Defining "Security" in the African Environment (Plenary) [Rocky Williams] 14: Assessing the Security Environment: National and Regional (Discussion Groups) (Lunch) 15: The Foundations of Security Strategy (Plenary) [Grant Hammond]	Sub-regional Security Strategy: Defining Interests and Priorities in Democratic States (Discussion Groups)	Thursday 13 July 31: Capstone Exercise (Exercise Groups) (Lunch) Panel: Oversight, Accountability, and Public Debate [Ojo, Kayosa, De] 32: Capstone Exercise (Exercise Groups)	(US Ambassador s Reception)
Wednesday 5 July	8: Democratization: Issues and Patterns (Plenary) [Ibrahim Wani] 9: Democratic Transition in Africa: Challenges and Prospects (Discussion Groups) (Lunch) 10: The Military in Democratic Transition (Discussion Groups) 11: Human Rights and the	(Discussion Groups) (Dinner) 12: Dean's Event: (Panel-SADC) [Lucy Dlamini, Gavin Cawthra]	Wednesday 12 July 27: Capstone Exercise Preparation (Plenary) [Eric Bonnemaison] 28: Capstone Exercise Preparation (Exercise Groups) (Lunch) Optional: SADF Announcement of Int'1 Conf on Environ. Security 29: Capstone Exercise Preparation (Exercise Groups) (Dinner) 30: Deans' Event: (Panel: HIV/AIDS and	Security Strategy) [Sinah Chaba, Stephen Talugende, Ms. Kazembe]
Tuesday 4 July	4: Civilian Control of the Military (Plenary) [Eboe Hutchful] 5: Civilian Control of the Military: Challenges and Issues in Africa (Discussion Groups) (Lunch) 6: Institutionalizing Civilian Control of the Military (Discussion Groups)	Professionalism (Discussion Groups) (US HOLIDAY) (GOB Reception)	Tuesday 11 July * Faculty Capstone Orient. 24: Defense Budgeting in Africa: Thinking Long Term (Plenary) [Peter Batchelor] 25: Defense Budgeting in Africa: Thinking Long Term (Discussion Groups) (Lunch) [Speaker: Mr. Moleboge, Botswana's Police Commissioner] 26: Bang for the Buck: How Much Security for What Resources? (Discussion Groups)	
Monday 3 July	Opening Ceremony/ Director Welcome/GOB Welcome (Plenary) 1: Inaugural Lecture: "Africa in the 21" Contury" (Plenary) Administrative Brief (Plenary) (Lunch) Dean's Overview (Plenary) 2: Team Building	3: Civil-Military Relations: An Overview (Panel) [A.T.Toure, Welch, Fomunyoh, Jamerson]	Monday 10 July 20: Where to Find the Resources: The Three Economies of Africa (Plenary) [Freeman] 21: Where to Find the Resources: The Three Economies of Africa (Discussion Groups) (Lunch) 22: Defense Economics: What Does it Mean in the African Context? (Plenary) [Peter Batchelor] 23: Defense Economics: What Does it Mean in the African Context? (Plenary) [Peter Batchelor]	(Discussion Groups) LTG Fisher Presentation
Sunday 2 July	(Lunch) ACSS Reception		Sunday 9 July GOB Cultural Tours	

Purpose of the End-of-Seminar Academic Summary

The End-of-Seminar Academic Summary is intended to provide each Leadership Seminar participant, prior to their departure from the Leadership Seminar, a summary of the salient topics and issues discussed at the Seminar. This is done so that they can immediately and effectively share the information with their supervisors, colleagues, and all interested parties, upon their return home.

The End-of-Seminar Academic Summary is drawn from the Daily Rapporteur Summaries that were compiled for each of the Seminar's eight discussion groups. Additionally, summaries of the plenary lectures and plenary panel sessions are included.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies also hopes to "spread the word" by publishing this Summary. ACSS alumni are known to extensively photocopy and distribute the Summary. We hope that each recipient of the Summary repeats that act ("the multiplier effect"), thus allowing key messages about democratic governance, from Africans themselves, to proliferate throughout the continent.

The ACSS core value of non-attribution has been observed in the compilation of this Summary. No speaker or discussant is mentioned by name or position. This essential feature of ACSS seminars enables frank, candid, and open dialogue throughout the program, and thus markedly enhances learning.

Purpose of the Leadership Seminar

The purpose of the Leadership Seminar is to afford participants an opportunity to consider and evaluate alternative approaches to the pressing challenges of democratic defense. The Seminar explored potential solutions to the challenges of reconciling the often-competing priorities of security and liberty in developing democracies.

The format of the Leadership Seminar emphasizes small-group discussions and practical exercises. Participants also received several presentations by subject matter experts. However, most of the participants' time at the seminar was spent in smaller discussion groups of about 15 members. Each of the discussion groups was structured for maximum diversity of background and region and was led by two facilitators: an African and a US/European faculty member. Each group had one rapporteur whose duty it was to capture the main themes of each session. All group sessions and plenaries were simultaneously translated into French and English.

The two-week curriculum was structured around the three core subjects of civil-military relations, national security strategy, and defense economics. These core subject areas were complemented by a final Capstone Exercise designed to help tie the subjects into a coherent whole.

Civil-Military Relations Module

The Civil-Military Relations module examined the relationship between civilian government officials, civil society, and the military in democratic states. Attention was also given to the manner in which the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches should relate to the military. This module also sought to define the responsibilities that public- and private-sector actors should fulfill in order to achieve and maintain the balance, including the imperatives of civil supremacy and maintenance of a professional, non-partisan military that serves and protects all members of the state.

A Speaker Discusses Civil-Military Relations.

In a plenary session, a speaker gave an overview of civil-military relations in Africa. In his talk, he highlighted the conditions necessary for the promotion of civil-military relations and then looked specifically at the case of his own country and its transition to democracy and civilian rule.

The speaker began his talk by highlighting some of the changes in Africa following the demise of the Cold War: "There was a new wave in our continent and a quest for democracy, freedom, liberty, and political pluralism." However, many African countries found themselves beset by economic problems, which made transition to democracy even more difficult. Many of these countries were also faced with another problem – their militaries. Throughout this period there had been a growing politicization of the African military. Through their positions in the higher echelons of political parties and coups, the military was increasingly able to seize power and political opportunities. In many cases, this seizing of power was to put an end to bad governance and the bad political situations that were prevailing in African states. As the speaker explained, "often the government in a country is having problems and the military feels that they have the means to fix them and save democracy."

The speaker stressed that there is a fundamental need in all states for a military. The issue that needs to be resolved is how African militaries can accept civilian control and remain professional and respect the people and the state. The military must be subject to civilian authority.

Additionally, the speaker emphasized the importance of the rule of law. The law must be clear about the use of force and the specific roles and missions of the army. Neutrality should also be a fundamental principle of the military. The military plays a crucial role in defending a state's territory, but the military needs to be accountable to the commander-in-chief. The army should be a primary instrument of the state in providing security but should also recognize its role as a "social equalizer" within the state. These fundamental principles are central to developing civil-military relations.

The speaker stressed that the reason for the coup in his country, like in many other African countries, was poor governance. Coups rarely occur when state resources are properly managed, and when power is not concentrated in the hands of one group. The

speaker recognized that part of the problem in his country was that the military was shrouded in secrecy and that there was a need for greater transparency. Since the establishment of civilian rule in his state, the army has adopted a formal code of conduct. This was done to improve the image of the army within civil society and to create greater transparency and accountability of the army to the Malian state. This has been an important part of creating better civil-military relations in his state.

A Speaker Describes How To Achieve Civil Control of the Military.

In another plenary session, a speaker discussed civil control of the military. He began by highlighting the fact that civil-military and defense reform is occurring on a global scale. The speaker explained that these reforms were not confined to the developing world.

The speaker began by stating that there were a number of issues to consider when discussing civilian control of the military. Those issues include the universal consensus of democracy, the global character of the momentum of change, and the mobilization of international support for demilitarization and security reform. However, he stressed that although defense reform was happening on a global scale, developing countries are often beset with particular problems in this realm. This is particularly due to globalization, sub-regional conflicts, and state disintegration. The speaker argued that the means states in Africa use to handle these two problems will be crucial for their development and future.

The speaker emphasized that, in Africa, the transition to democracy is a diversified and complex process and that there is no one way for it to be implemented. Transitions to democracy are specific to each country; however, there were some trends that could be drawn out, particularly with regard to regimes that have had the most difficulty in transitioning to civilian control.

The speaker discussed the notion of civilian control. He stated that civil supremacy is marked by a number of factors. Those factors include preserving the rights of the military under civilian oversight. He stressed that the idea of civilian control should be regarded as a process, not a fact. He went on to say that because the term "civil" is ambiguous, there is always a need to clarify its meaning in a given context. The speaker argued that the concept of civil control does not mean "civilian," but refers to "civil." "Civil" implies that there is a constitution and a greater amount of legitimacy. In addition, he emphasized that civilian control is not confined to one sector of government.

There are also important variables to keep in mind when discussing civilian control, which include shared norms, how to implant civil control, and the need for skilled statecraft. These variables need to be understood when confronting the challenges of redefining the mission doctrine of the military and defining civil control in the state. Civil leadership is increasingly finding itself forced to rebuild and stabilize military structures. Similarly, civilian control cannot be imposed and must be accepted as a foundation of democracy.

The speaker argued that partnership between the military, political parties, and civil society is imperative for successful civilian control. Partnership is the bedrock for sustaining these relations. There are many positive reasons why the military would benefit from such partnerships, including greater legitimacy and stronger military institutions. The speaker concluded that it is the responsibility of civilians to build up their own expertise and knowledge in order to work with the military to create defense and security policy.

Civilian Control of the Military: Challenges and Issues in Africa

During this session, participants highlighted the challenges and issues many sub-Saharan African nations face in matters of civilian control of the military. The most prevalent issue raised was that members of the parliaments and politicians in African states are not qualified to address civilian control of the military. Participants expressed concern that civilian governments tend not to be interested in military affairs. Some discussion groups also suggested that when civilian governments function well, there is very little strife between civilian government and the military. However, when a civilian government does not function properly, the military tends to intervene. In this context, participants asked what the responsibility of civilians should be when civilian institutions do not fulfill their obligations to citizens. Many discussants recognized the importance of a strong civil society to increase their level of involvement when governments are not fulfilling political obligations to citizens. Some participants added that under no circumstances should the military usurp civilian authority.

Participants addressed the need for African nations to establish constitutional frameworks that clearly define the roles of both the military and civilian governments. Participants were convinced that such a framework would outline the military's subordination to the constitution and not to an individual leader. In one discussion group, participants concluded that civilian supremacy of the military could be advantageous to the military. Parliamentarians and politicians have a constitutional mandate to formulate defense policy and to define its parameters. Consequently, acceptance of civilian supremacy will, in turn, make it easier for the military to have its mission and role clearly defined and adequate resources made available to it.

The difficulty of bringing former revolutionary and liberation armies under civilian control was also raised. Participants discussed the creation of defense forces from revolutionary and liberation armies, such as in Zimbabwe in 1980. Most discussion groups concurred that these types of forces pose particular problems such as those witnessed in the recent election in Zimbabwe. Participants were skeptical about the Zimbabwean military's acceptance of the election results, because the army perceives itself as a party military, and not as a tool for the entire state. Participants stressed that such phenomena are prevalent in nations that are transitioning from autocratic to democratic rule. Nevertheless, African nations and sub-regional organizations must begin to emphasize the need for such militaries to disengage from party politics and direct support of a specific political party.

Participants also recognized the particular challenge indigenous institutions, such as chieftancies and kingdoms, pose to the democratic process in Africa. They grappled with how to effectively use such institutions to further democratization. Several participants thought that, in fact, there is a need to integrate existing traditional structures into emerging democracies. It was also suggested that integrating indigenous structures into emerging democracies could lead to more viable civil-military relations and that this mélange could be a more relevant methodology for African states that are transitioning to democracies. Some participants criticized the lack of analysis on incorporating indigenous institutions into the African democratic process.

Institutionalizing Civilian Control of the Military

According to many participants, before addressing institutionalization of civilian control of the military, it is necessary for the roles and missions of civilian governments and militaries to be clearly defined. The military's role and mission should be limited to defending territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the constitution. The military must see itself as the custodian of the country's constitution, and under no circumstances should the military get involved in politics. Some participants noted that many African constitutions were imported from European models that are not characterized by the principles and norms inherent in African societies. Therefore, the need exists for the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of some African governments to reexamine their constitutions and their relevance to African political cultures.

Finding Common Ground for the Military and for Civilians

It was argued that in many Western countries, there are the financial means to educate the population about the military and its function. Participants suggested that when civilians are aware of the military's roles and missions, there is less likely to be misunderstanding and strife. In many developed countries, there are institutions and training programs that bring the military and civilians together, thus fostering institutional civilian control. However, in many African countries, there is no venue for the ordinary citizen and the military to dialogue and understand each other's roles. Participants recommended that more for should be established to bring the two entities together.

Relevance of Coups d'État

Participants highlighted the importance of establishing a clear link between the objectives of the military and the financial resources available to achieve them. When this link is not clearly drawn, a country runs the risk of creating a military environment that is hostile and prone to subversive activities. Some participants raised the point of the preponderance of coups d'état in developing countries. According to some, coups are indirectly linked to the level of development in a country. Participants reasoned that coups were also linked to weak political structures and poor institutional development. If the military is to be effectively subordinated to civilian control, it must be properly catered to.

African Nations Moving in the "Civilian Control" Direction

Participants examined the successful civil-military relations enjoyed by Botswana, Senegal, and South Africa, and the institutions these countries have in place to ensure civilian control of the military. For example, South Africa has implemented effective oversight mechanisms such as an activist Parliamentary Standing Committee and an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Security. The example of Malawi was also cited. In Malawi, a process is underway to develop a defense policy in which key stakeholders will be given an opportunity to provide input.

Ethics and Professionalism

This session began with the premise that professionalism, among other things, refers to a code of behavior or rules that have already been established and respected by members of that profession. Ethics refers to moral values. Participants emphasized the need to recognize that ethical standards vary from country to country. Nevertheless, professionalism is a fundamental precondition for the military to accept civil control.

Loyalty: To the Regime or to the State?

African militaries often find themselves trying to determine whether their loyalty is to the regime currently in power or to the state, which, theoretically, is static. It was quickly agreed that the armed forces should not be used for individual heads of state. In countries where there is a strong leader, it is often difficult to determine whether the leader or the constitution is in control. This issue becomes particularly difficult when a leader uses the military for individual purposes. Participants used the Presidential Guard as a prime example of the loyalty dilemma. African Presidential Guards are often forced to determine whether they are to be responsive to the president or to the constitution. In such cases, the guard might find itself opposed to the constitution for the sake of protecting the President.

Punishing Unethical Behavior

The participants stressed the need for African nations to develop judicial systems that can properly punish unethical behavior. These judicial systems need to be strengthened so that politicians who have broken the law can be judged. It is also important to have a strong judicial system established to punish the military when it violates its own ethical and professional code.

A Speaker Discusses Issues and Patterns of Democratization in Africa.

A US Congressman began by introducing the speaker. The speaker began his talk by raising questions about democracy as it relates to Africa. He suggested that in the years following independence, African nations questioned whether democracy was appropriate and beneficial. Currently, the acceptability of democracy as a form of government is a foregone conclusion, and most African states embrace the notion of democracy. Nevertheless, the speaker cautioned that the discussion about the manner in which democracy is applied in Africa must continue.

The speaker questioned whether African nations are genuinely democratized. In many cases, Africa's dictators of yesterday are today's "democrats," he stated. More importantly, the speaker pointed out that African institutions have not changed. The same political and institutional structures that were used to oppress African citizens are still in place.

Thus, the speaker recommended that the very nature of the African state must be reexamined. During the colonial period, the state was used for exploitation. In contemporary Africa, the state is being used for the very same purpose. As a result, the speaker noted that "for the ordinary African, the state is useless." African states must decentralize and become more responsive to the citizens, both in the rural and urban areas, who elected them. The speaker recognized that there are those who suggest that democracy in Africa is superficial and that too much emphasis is placed on elections. In addition, there are also those who argue that states are democratizing too quickly. Despite these concerns, African citizens have become frustrated and disgruntled with the status quo, and the speaker sensed that no one is seriously debating why the state is not responding more effectively to its citizens' needs.

There was also discussion about the catalyst for democracy in Africa. The speaker suggested that there were international reasons for the democratic movement in Africa, such as the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the informational power and influence of the international media. More importantly, he suggested, the real impetus for democratic transitions was African citizens' frustration with their governments. The economies of many African nations are crumbling. The speaker expressed concern that, while the theoretical debate about what type of democracy is best for Africa continues, on the ground, the desire is clear. African citizens tend to desire an improved quality of life and respect for individual freedoms.

The speaker also discussed practical issues like participation and representation. indicated that at independence, most African leaders decided not to embrace democracy, because they thought that unity was more important. He suggested that these leaders sensed that democracy, with its notion of an opposition party, open debate, and so forth, could add acrimony to regional, ethnic, and religious tensions in a state. However, in contemporary Africa, participation, competition, and power-sharing are essential to the success of African nations. The speaker recognized that Africa's diversity is a challenge for its democracies. Nevertheless, he argued that ethnicity and religious diversity cannot and should not be suppressed. He reminded the assembled people that it is not the fault of democracy that many leaders have used ethnicity and religious differences to divide people. In addition, the speaker highlighted the need for representation to continue well beyond elections. He further criticized the development and representation that have been focused on the capital city areas. He also explained how African parliamentarians are often not in touch with their constituencies. As a result, the speaker stated that those who are elected to represent the people should be made to live among them. Those representatives should be forced to tell citizens what they have done and should be held accountable for responding to those who voted them into office.

Democratic Transition in Africa: Challenges and Prospects

African Parliaments Criticized as Hampering the Democratic Process

Parliamentary committees on defense were often described by the Seminar's participants as weak and unable to make meaningful contributions to stable and democratic civil-military relations. The consensus was that this frailness is a reflection of generally weak parliaments across Africa. Participants argued that legislatures in many states are weak because parliamentarians seek personal wealth, as opposed to representing the interests of their constituencies. Importantly, it was also noted that weak legislatures, poor attendance at parliamentary sessions, and self-enrichment are not unique to Africa.

Poverty Described as a Key Challenge to Democracy in Africa

Participants noted that those who live under wealth-seeking autocrats are likely to be victims of abject poverty. As a result, these individuals are less concerned about contributing to and being a part of the democratic process. In such environments, voter apathy is particularly high, and voter turnout is low. Participants also expressed frustration that politicians exacerbate these situations with short-term strategies and voter manipulation. The example of food distribution before elections was cited. Participants argued that politicians and parliamentarians must begin to devise long-term socioeconomic programs that will address the needs of their constituencies.

Participants also expressed concern that many African nations do not have the financial means to embrace democracy. Civic programs are needed at the grassroots level so that citizens are made aware of the basic principles of democracy. Participants thought that such an investment would be well spent, because these programs will foster a culture of democracy and help citizens understand the processes for sustaining democracy. Participants also opined that in order to have elections, the financial resources must be available. In this context, participants also cautioned that elections often take place for the sole purpose of satisfying the international and donor communities.

Security Strategy Module

This module focused on the themes of defining security in the African environment; assessing the national and regional security environments; the foundations of security strategy; making national and sub-regional security, with a special focus on defining interests and priorities in democratic states; strategizing for conflict management and conflict resolution in Africa; the tools and actors for making security strategy; defining roles and missions for the security services in democratic states; and examining the civil society, national security, and military nexus.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Regional Security

Two speakers discussed SADC's role in regional security.

The first speaker began with an overview of the history and current role of the regional organization SADC. The speaker discussed its origins and its current mission to harmonize economic development in the region. It was not until the 1990s that SADC began to build a security component to the regional organization, acknowledging the fact that development was improbable without stability and security.

The speaker explained that the main objective of the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC), the security and defense component of SADC, was to promote and defend peace and security in the region. The speaker emphasized that its main role was as a collaborative security arrangement. Its other roles include military training, peacekeeping training, capacity building, monitoring of small arms transfers, enforcing sanctions against UNITA, prevention of aggression, early warning and conflict resolution.

The second speaker began by stating that he would be more critical of the role and past work of SADC. The speaker went on to discuss some of the current challenges confronting SADC. It was acknowledged that SADC had achieved many accomplishments. However, the speaker observed that it has failed to deal with the most serious crisis in the region, particularly DRC and Angola, which continue to be mired in conflict. It has also failed in its objectives of crisis intervention, particularly in the case of Lesotho.

The speaker suggested that there were key challenges for the structure of SADC. They include the structural problems with the Organ for Defense, Security and Politics. Another problem is that SADC commits itself to mediation and diplomacy; however, it does not have sufficient mechanisms to efficiently undertake these objectives. SADC also has structural problems with its relationship with the OAU and the UN. Lastly, it has failed to work out an appropriate role for civil society and non-governmental organizations.

The speaker highlighted the problems of SADC's mission and mandate. It seems to stand for different objectives. SADC's treaty emphasizes the need for human security; it places

development and human security at its core; and it is committed to promoting democratic practices and human rights. However, it operates with strict respect to sovereignty and non-involvement in the internal affairs of other states. The speaker argued that these two objectives are in direct contradiction to one another. Additionally, SADC has not defined itself as either a collaborative or a collective security organization.

On the positive side, there is a genuine move towards regionalism in Africa, and SADC has some of the important foundations already in place. SADC needs to build a basis for common security. One of the main challenges for SADC and other regional organizations in Africa is the lack of political will. In order to strengthen its role, SADC needs to clarify its role and mission and outline the role it wants to play in regional politics.

Security in the African Context Defined

The speaker began by stating that security since the end of the Cold War has undergone major refinements and redefinitions.

The speaker began the session by asking the participants to consider two situations. In the first situation the participants were asked to consider what security meant to an Ethiopian commander in Asmara engaged in conflict. The second situation dealt with what security meant to a refugee who had been displaced by the same war. This exercise was an attempt to get participants to consider the broad range of security concerns that Africa and the world are facing.

It was further explained that since the end of the Cold War, there has been a move away from the traditional concepts of security to a broader definition of human security. This broader definition of security includes issues like poverty, disease, political violence, hunger, environmental destruction, inadequate housing, unemployment, and fear.

However, each country's definition of security needs to be contextualized to fit its specific concerns. Each country and individual must define what causes insecurity, and whether it is internal or external. There has been a move towards human security, which is focused on securing the rights of the individual. The human-oriented security paradigm is much less about procuring arms and deploying troops, and more about strengthening the social and environmental fabric of societies. Pursuing military security at the cost of individual security was compared to the dismantling of a house to erect a fence to protect it.

Peace is necessary for developing human security. It is also necessary for political stability, individual growth and development. The critical areas to consider are development, governance, democracy and human rights, security-sector reform, and sub-regional capabilities. The speaker highlighted the need to expand the actors in formulating human security as well. A state needs to incorporate civil society, churches, trade unions, NGOs, traditional leaders, the private sector, parliament, and the international community in order to really transform security thinking and formulation.

However, the speaker stated that the roles and tasks of the armed forces need to change. The armed forces should not be viewed solely as an institution to maintain security against external attack. The speaker questioned how the armed forces could support the new broadened approach to security. Increasingly, security forces are playing roles in non-traditional tasks, such as peacekeeping, development tasks, and humanitarian relief. Additionally, the security threat in many African states is changing, since more often than not, the security threats are internal and not external

Lastly, the speaker emphasized the need for cooperation between civil society and the military to make this redefinition of security work. The state needs to undertake this broadened security strategy, but also needs to make the military feel comfortable with its new roles.

Assessing the Security Environment: National and Regional

Participants generally concurred with the speaker's statement that the concept of security has undergone transformation since the end of the Cold War. Participants analyzed the example of the new South African government and how it has embraced the broader concept of security in its defense policy. The new government wanted to break with the country's past legacy of apartheid in which the civilian government used the military to threaten and oppress citizens opposed to the apartheid regime. In addition, at the end of the Cold War, there was a shift in the threat perception. South Africa's White Paper on Defense states that for the next one or two decades, there will not likely be any external threats to the country from the region or abroad.

Types of Interests

Participants discussed national interests in terms of whether they were survival, vital, or important interests. Survival interests were characterized as interests such as the need to secure the territorial integrity of the state and to ensure access to irreplaceable commodities like water. Vital interests were considered to pertain to the well-being of the people, protection of the principles of democracy, and protection of economic interests. Participants considered peace to be a vital interest, but agreed that it might not always fall within the vital interest category. Important interests refer to the need to have influence over regional and global events. These interests encompass conditions like regional stability and support for humanitarian activities.

The crucial issue of establishing who has the right to determine national interests was debated. Some participants suggested that only parliament should have the right to shape national interests. Other participants articulated the importance of involving civil society and seemed to agree that the task of setting national interests cannot be left to parliament alone.

Should Security Go Private?

Some participants cited the growing presence of private security firms in African nations as affecting the continent's security environment. Some participants argued that the presence of such firms is useful, because the state is not always in a position to provide

security services for its citizens. Private security firms often do a better job of providing security than the state and are often more cost-effective. Conversely, other participants expressed concern about such arrangements. These participants questioned how these firms would be held responsible for their actions and to whom they would be accountable.

Security Can No Longer Be Achieved Unilaterally

Many African nations have come to recognize that security cannot be maintained in isolation, and that neighboring countries must be involved in security in order for it to be sustainable. Many participants stated that their own national security strategy was based on the security of their region. As a result, more nations are joining sub-regional organizations to ensure individual and regional stability. Participants mentioned the example of the seven-member West African organization ANAD (Accord de Nonagression et d'Assistance en matière de Défense). This non-aggression pact played a major role in ending the war between Mali and Burkina Faso in 1986. Other participants expressed concern that smaller and weaker states run the risk of losing their voice in certain regional arrangements. However, the example of ECOWAS was used to illustrate that, though Nigeria is the regional power, within the confines of the regional organization it has no hegemonic designs and each country is given an equal voice and importance.

Foundations of Security Strategy

The speaker spoke on security strategy in democratic societies. He began by defining strategy as the science or art of combining and employing the means of war in planning and directing large-scale military movements and operations. Strategy also entails having a plan, method, or series of maneuvers for obtaining a specific goal or result.

The speaker explained the four elements of strategy: objectives (ends); plan of action (ways); resources (means); and the environment. When nations are in the process of drafting security strategy, it is necessary to develop objectives. These objectives should relate to a nation's vision and how it sees itself. The plan of action outlines how the nation will achieve its objectives. He also stressed the importance of making sure the resources are adequate and available to achieve the objectives. He also emphasized two critical factors. The first is the importance of correctly assessing the environment. He stated that if everything is in place, but a nation misreads the environment in which it operates, the strategy is destined to fail. Secondly, there is a need to focus on outcomes. The input to strategy is essential, but making the vision a reality is more important.

The presentation outlined six kinds of strategies: grand, national security, military, political, economic, and informational/psychological. Grand strategy is the art and science of employing all elements of national power in support of national interests. National security strategy focuses on decisions taken on behalf of the state to protect or pursue its national interests and promote its values. Military strategy provides for the physical security of leadership and government, borders and territory, citizens at home and abroad, and wealth and resources. The speaker stated that the military strategy should focus on deterrence and defense. It also has both external and internal missions.

The speaker argued that there are regional aspects of national security strategy that must be considered. He highlighted that many issues and problems occur within states, while others may occur across several states. He recognized that that within the African context, many nations might be too small to handle problems effectively. Therefore, strategy must be tailored to fit the individual nation's circumstances.

The speaker concluded that security strategy is art as well as science. He stressed that strategy works best when the focus is on people first and ideas second. Strategy requires constant focus on the ends, not just ways and means.

<u>Making National and Sub-Regional Security Strategy - Defining Interests and Priorities in Democratic States</u>

During the course of discussion, participants realized that a national security strategy provides the basis upon which a government can decide whether or not to intervene militarily in a given conflict. Participants assessed that far too few African countries have national security strategies or even oversight mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the state's security strategy. A national security strategy was defined as an operational document that clearly outlines a country's primary interests and objectives, identifies the means and instruments by which such objectives and interests are pursued or preserved, and puts in place oversight mechanisms to monitor progress.

To Intervene or Not to Intervene? That Is the Question for Many African Nations

Throughout the African continent, there are many nations that are intervening in conflicts that may or may not bear a connection to vital or strategic interests. Participants questioned what interests were being threatened when Guinea got involved in the Liberian conflict. Participants compared this scenario to Zimbabwe's intervention in Mozambique in the 1980s. Participants concluded that Zimbabwe had legitimate strategic interests in Mozambique, because its fuel supplies came through the port of Beira. Zimbabwean troops were deployed to guard the oil pipeline, which was threatened by the MNR rebels. However, Guinea did not have the same interests in Liberia. Participants highlighted that political instability in a neighboring country poses a direct threat to the stability of its neighbors. In such cases, neighbors do have an interest in maintaining and preserving stability.

Panel Discussion on Strategizing for Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution in Africa

The security strategy module ended with a plenary discussion on "Strategizing for Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution." The purpose of the panel was to highlight the tools that are available to states when confronted with security challenges. The point was made that tools need to be specific to the context and need to be in harmony with the task, which is an important part of creating security strategy.

The plenary began with a presentation on crisis management. The speaker began with the statement, "conflict ruins you before you are able to build capacity." He went on to

say that Africa cannot look for solutions elsewhere, but must find the solutions within the continent. He then went on to describe what he saw as the major characteristics of conflict and crisis, and what had changed in the 1990s. He felt that the major changes were that conflict had become more contagious, violent and technological. The kinds of operations that are needed include prevention, resolution, management, termination, and containment. An effective military must have four components – deterrence, protection, prevention, and projection. He outlined four main tasks for the military during conflict and crisis: international military operations, support of civil authority, humanitarian operations, and unilateral military operations. In order to achieve success in these operations, the military needs to follow certain guidelines, including legitimacy, restraint, unity, achievable mandate, and link objectives to a political solution in the country. In concluding, the speaker sensed that African militaries may need to focus more on development and modernization. He stressed the need for the military to focus on people, not just machines.

The next presenter spoke on the role of women's groups in the resolution of the Taureg conflict in Mali. The speaker was part of an initiative, in the early 1990s, that mobilized women in an attempt to resolve the crisis in Mali. The group targeted the governing authority, rebels, and various communities to raise awareness about peaceful coexistence and peaceful reconciliation. The group focused on developing person-to-person cooperation. Another method used was sensitization programs that tried to dismiss rumors, which could really hurt prospects for peace. The speaker also emphasized the importance of external actors, including workshops that the US undertook and support from other African organizations.

The following speaker discussed the role of ANAD's security and peace missions and what their future and limitations included. ANAD is an organization of the West African Community and was originally established to support economic cooperation between those states. Its mandate moved into security some time after it was established to include regional defense. However, in recent years ANAD has been faced with serious economic difficulties due to competition in West Africa from ECOWAS. The speaker laid out two possibilities for ANAD: it could either establish a peace force to make ANAD more efficient, or integrate ANAD into ECOWAS to make a stronger regional body. However, everything depends on the will of the states involved.

The last presenter addressed issues associated with civil society and conflict management. He focused on who civil society was and what role it should play in conflict resolution. Most view civil society as those groups that exercise political influence. However, he questions what role they actually play in resolving conflict. Conflict-resolution NGOs have a fortunate place in civil society when dealing with conflict. They do not have the limitations of bureaucracy and they have time to listen to the demands of different parties in conflict. However, they are limited by their lack of resources. While it is true that not all NGOs are "good" and many have their own agenda, it is important to remember that these organizations can help, and it would be useful for governments to foster a working relationship with them. The speaker recommended that the governments utilize the work of NGOs through involving them in early warning, policy work, and briefings on areas where they have an expertise.

Making Security Strategy: The Tools and the Actors

Participants discussed the military, economic, political/diplomatic and ideological/informational elements of power. The relevance of these tools in the African context was also questioned. Discussants mentioned the importance of regional cooperation as a tool available for African leaders for formulation of their national security strategy. It was also suggested that Africa's most predominant security threat is economic in nature. As a result, African leaders are faced with the challenge of developing prudent economic policies and program that will help to alleviate problems related to poverty.

The resurgence of ethnic violence and religious fundamentalism as a security threat was also highlighted during discussions. Participants stressed the need for African nations to begin to engender their own proactive conflict-management strategies, as opposed to reacting to internal clashes.

Participants suggested that the legislature should be at the center of security decision-making. However, it was further explained that the fragile nature of Africa's legislative institutions had to be taken into account. It was also agreed that even though the media should not necessarily be an actor, it should be involved in disseminating public information and opinion.

Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organizations

Participants stressed the importance of non-governmental actors playing an active role in security planning. Some participants observed that most internal conflicts emanate from within the society itself, such as ethnic, religious, and other social conflicts. Therefore, civil society organizations should play a more responsive role in preventing, resolving, and managing conflicts. Others held contrasting views and stated that civil society is not competent enough to deal with conflict situations. Nevertheless, it was concluded that civilian governments and civil society have complementary roles in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts and should develop better partnerships.

Regional Cooperation

Regional organizations, such as ECOWAS and EAC, play an important role in security formulation. Though many of Africa's sub-regional organizations were created to address economic quandaries, over the course of their existence they have become increasingly involved in security matters. Participants stressed the importance of regional cooperation to assist member states, thereby creating greater security and stability in the regions.

Defining Roles and Mission for the Security Services in Democratic States

The primary function of African militaries is to defend, deter, and protect, but they are increasingly called upon to perform secondary tasks. The point was emphasized that the majority of threats to national security in Africa are internal. The nature of these threats to security renders the military redundant to traditional internal security forces. Some participants argued that it is necessary for the military to protect the country from border

incursions, to deal with banditry, and to secure the country's borders. An illustrative example that was offered was the incident in Djibouti after the fall of the Mengistu regime in 1991. There was an influx of nearly 35,000 armed Ethiopians. Without a military, this situation could have severely undermined Djibouti's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nevertheless, African militaries are frequently ill-equipped to handle new tasks associated with new security threats. African militaries tend too be heavily dependent on external sources of supply for weapons, equipment, and sometimes uniforms. Several participants cited the South African and Egyptian militaries as exceptions to these forms of dependence.

Civil Society, National Security and the Military Panel Discussion

One of the primary aims of ACSS is to bridge the gap between civil society and the military. The panel on Civil Society, National Security and the Military was therefore convened to provide participants with the opportunity to hear from activists within civil society.

In very brief and succinct introductions, the panelists provided overviews of their work and their positions on civil-military relations. The first presenter referred to the common misperceptions of the role of NGOs, and stressed the importance of distinguishing between civil and civilian society, while cautioning against the automatic inclusion of political parties within the overall definition of civil society. To some consternation from the floor, the speaker defined the general public perception of the military as monolithic, unaccountable, non-transparent and threatening.

The second speaker described the rise of NGOs as a reaction to the failure of the Babangida regime to democratize. He confirmed that the organization is now working with other groups in Africa to mobilize and pursue the objectives of deepening democracy and respect for human rights and to engage structures in Nigeria to encourage democracy and good governance.

The third speaker stressed the importance of breaking down the misperceptions of civil society that prevail and the need for harmonization and cooperation between civil society and the military for mutually enhancing results. He also highlighted the diverse areas of specialization undertaken by NGOs and other groups within civil society.

The last speaker observed that the relationship between the military and civil society is a good indicator of the level of democracy and good governance, and, in Africa at least, is contingent on the level of democratization existing at the time. All the panelists stressed the importance of transparency and cooperation.

Numerous questions and comments ensued from the floor, dealing with diverse issues such as the inclusion of political parties within the definition of civil society, the participation of the military in politics, the external funding of NGOs, and the accountability of NGOs and civil society in general.

Defense Economics Module

The Defense Economics module explored ways to enhance efficient and transparent allocation of national resources between security-related and non-security requirements; analyzed the relationship between national security and economic development; examined how national security is financed in a democracy; and presented opportunities to understand how military expenditures affect growth, development, and security.

Plenary - Where to Find the Resources: The Three Economies of Africa

In his introduction, the moderator commented that having discussed civil-military relations and security strategy, the pressing requirement was to now clarify the requisite funding in accordance with the democratic principles of transparency and accountability. This, he explained, was the raison d'être of the Defense Economics module.

The presenter commenced the session by underscoring the importance of resource identification to the budget process, and noted the often-complex nature of African economies. The speaker further explained the reasoning behind the "Three Economies of Africa," or the informal, formal (or Bretton Woods), and global economies. She stressed that this was not a formal model but a suggested process or conceptualization.

The speaker set the scene for the discussion by describing the colonial economic policy that provided a framework for economic affairs on the continent. The speaker detailed the colonial policy of extraction and exploitation that has been continued by African leaders. The speaker further effectively demonstrated how limited growth, low levels of production, and dependency have afflicted most African economies.

The presenter then moved to a more detailed explanation of the three economies. She described the informal economy as an essentially unregulated shadow economy covering the spectrum of economic activities. She indicated that the informal economy was based on personalized guarantees and exists largely outside state control. While the speaker referred to some of the negative effects of the informal economy, including the skewing of banking systems, she stressed that it remains the most vibrant and far-reaching economy in Africa, deserving of greater academic and practical attention than it has hitherto been accorded.

In discussing the formal economy, the increasing recognition of the advantages of the market system, including greater transparency and the ability to generate wealth and production, were described. Reforms that have taken place in this regard were said to include trade and exchange liberalization, the cessation of interest rate control, the elimination of price controls and privatization. Obstacles were said to include a decline in trade and a continued skepticism regarding the African business environment.

With regard to the global economy, the speaker explained that although Africa has been less affected than other regions, effects have included the development of over 20 stock exchanges on the continent, the growth of telecommunications and information

technology, and increased regionalization. The most telling development, however, has been the increase in offshore investment of an estimated \$115 billion (US). Suggested reforms for capital flight included repatriation holidays and corruption management.

The main thrust of the speaker's presentation was that some form of convergence was required between the three systems, and that this could be attained through a greater awareness of the broad scope of economic activity prevalent on the continent. Questions and comments from the floor focused on the involvement of the international community in the economic difficulties faced by Africa, the impact of the Cold War, and the effects of Free Trade Zones.

Where to Find the Resources: The Three Economies of Africa

The Importance of the Informal Economy

In most discussion groups, participants thoroughly debated the notion of Africa's informal economies. The debates often focused on the merits and possibilities of integrating the informal economy into the formal economy. Participants criticized the World Bank and other international organizations for not taking into account the significance of this sector when conducting development work and economic research. The informal sector is a way of life in many African nations, and participants thought that leaders must begin to engender creative ways to develop partnerships between the formal and informal actors. Some participants applauded the informal sector, because it contributes to alleviating unemployment in many African countries. Others disapproved of the existence of the informal economy. These participants argued that the African informal economy is a result of tax evasion, unregulated business ventures, and revenue from corruption. It was believed that the failure of the formal economy has given rise to and strengthened the informal economy.

Corruption and the Lack of Investments in Africa

Participants addressed the stereotype that Africa is a continent plagued with widespread corruption. Most participants agreed that corruption is a worldwide problem that is not exclusive to the African continent. However, due to the level of poverty in many African countries, the effects of corruption are felt more dramatically. Participants also reasoned that corruption is rampant because of the absence of the rule of law. Differences were noted between Western countries and African nations. For example, in the United States, if an official is found guilty of corruption, action is taken immediately to punish the guilty party. However, it was stated that in many African countries, the government is unable to prosecute persons guilty of corruption. Many African nations have not had much success in attracting foreign investment. Participants thought that this might be partially due to the perception that corruption is widespread and that it goes unpunished. It was recommended that if Africa is to attract investment and grow economically, a stable environment must be created.

Defense Economics in the African Context Is Discussed

In the second plenary lecture of the defense economics block, the speaker began by giving some of the basic concepts of economics to provide a foundation on which to understand defense economics.

The presenter began by making the observation that the world we live in has finite and scarce resources. However, the world we live in has infinite needs and demands. The challenge is to balance the two. Economics is the study of allocating these scarce resources between competing or alternative demands and needs. This is the key concept to understand in economics. Economics is about choice and scarcity.

What is defense economics? The presenter stated that there are two ways to approach this question. Defense economics can be the application of the tools and methods of economics to defense issues. Defense economics is also the focus on that part of economy that concerns defense issues. He observed that the field of defense economics is quite narrowly focused on the defense sector and the military realm. When we talk about defense economics we essentially focus on the armed forces and the defense sector.

Thus far, the field has largely been focused on developed countries. There are a variety of reasons why this has been the case. First, there is a lack of transparency on defense matters in Africa; this translates to defense spending as well. Additionally, there is often poor or no data on defense spending or activities, which is linked to problems of resources and capacity. Finally, there is very little public debate of matters of defense in Africa. As a result, there is little literature on defense economics about Africa.

So, why should defense economics be applied to Africa? The speaker stated that there are many reasons. It is important because of the scarce resources in many African countries and problems in the allocation of those resources. Another reason is because the armed forces in many African countries maintain a privileged place in society and government and there may be a need to rethink this approach. Finally, because of the high level of conflict experienced in Africa, it is necessary to reconsider the role of defense in the state. There are also key issues which need to be highlighted with defense economics in Africa. These include resources, efficiency and economic impact.

The speaker also highlighted four key themes to be considered when applying defense economics in Africa. These are defense expenditures, defense procurements, domestic arms production, and international arms trade. Who are the big spenders in Africa? The presenter distinguished between those who spend the most in terms of dollars, like Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Libya, Nigeria, and Angola, and those who spend most in terms of percentage of GDP, like Burundi, Rwanda, and Eritrea. The economic burden on the latter countries is much greater than on the former.

Defense Economics: What Does It Mean in the African Context?

It was argued that defense institutions are better equipped to define defense requirements than the legislature or unskilled civilians. The example of the United States' budget process was evoked to illustrate the need for transparency. It was pointed out that while defense institutions define the requirements, the executive branch controls the allocation of funds and spending prioritization. It was suggested that the budgeting procedure was in fact a political process and that the development of transparency requires the building of relations and mutual trust between the military and civil society.

Many African nations are faced with the "development or defense" dilemma. In nations where there is no external threat, it was thought that these nations could allocate more resources toward development. This argument was countered with the statement that a country without security is a country without economic development. Some participants were convinced that security is directly linked to development and that a nation cannot have one without the other.

Defense Budgeting in Africa: Thinking Long-Term

The presenter began by reminding the audience that each country has finite resources for the funding of national budgets. He then moved on to consider the manner in which the national budget is composed, highlighting the following as key issues:

- The size of the budget reflects the pool of available resources or the "constraints."
- Its structure reflects a society's priorities, choices, and preferences.
- The budget procedure often reflects political compromises and bargaining.
- In the real world, budgets are often a mixture of rational and political processes.

The speaker moved on to examine the defense budget itself, first cautioning that defense budgets do not require any specialized treatment, and that in a democratic society, with the exception of certain operations, they should be as transparent as the budgets of any other sector. The presenter then outlined specific issues pertinent to the defense budget, pointing out the lack of conclusive evidence on the priority of defense issues in Africa due to a lack of available data. He did, however, confirm that in countries with low levels of defense spending, a positive impact on the economy is often indicated.

The speaker detailed the various options for funding and their negative consequences. These included raising taxes, local or foreign borrowing, and the printing of money. The speaker also examined spending structures, usually made up of recurrent and capital expenditure, and advised that these often reflected the various arms of the defense sector. The "development budget" was described, and the difficulties in linking this to the recurrent budgets due to "ring-fencing" on the part of the donor community were explained. The issue of "cross-budgeting" or the inclusion of military expenditures in the budgets of alternative sectors of government was also examined.

The presenter then moved on to examine diverse budgeting systems, including input budgeting, output or program budgeting, and medium-term expenditure frameworks. The

speaker concluded by advising of the need to link policy, planning, and budgeting, and to evaluate and audit activities and spending. This monitoring process could then be utilized for the next cycle.

Questions and comments from the floor involved a clarification of the role of the Ministry of Finance regarding disbursements of budget funds, the distinction between output budgeting and the MTEF process, and a request for the speaker's own opinion as to the ideal budget allocation. The session then moved on to consider the interactive portion of the presentation.

Limited Resources and Hard Choices

The challenge many African nations face is how to allocate very limited resources. It was stated that the limited resources of most African countries do not allow for adequate defense programming. As a result, at times many African militaries are forced to use their limited resources to pay soldiers' salaries. Some participants characterized the African defense budgeting process as lacking available data, being short-sighted, and having weak linkages to the nation's overall security strategy plan.

Participants addressed the profoundly political nature of resource allocation. When budgets are prepared, there are political factors that parliamentarians must consider. It is parliament that debates and approves the defense budget. Unfortunately, parliamentarians and other members of civil society do not have adequate knowledge or information about military programs and, as a result, are unable to influence the appropriation of funds for defense purposes. Nevertheless, those not involved in the budgetary process must realize that budgeting involves difficult choices, preferences, and priorities. Participants stressed the need for mechanisms to be put in place to ensure financial accountability.

Participants concluded that African nations must accept and adhere to sound defense budgeting principles.

Bang for the Buck: How Much Security for What Resources?

Transparency

Nations must be willing to embrace transparency in the area of defense budgeting. It was pointed out that while civil society understands the need for some secrecy, complete secrecy only serves to encourage suspicion and a fear of wasted resources. It was stated that civil society could support military budgets if transparency were embraced. Some military participants proposed that the military warrants a certain amount of secrecy. These participants were concerned about the extent to which transparency could compromise the military's operational capabilities. Participants agreed that the military could be transparent about certain budgetary issues, while maintaining secrecy on matters related to national interests.

Military Strategy Discussion

The speaker began the lecture by highlighting a variety of issues and questions that need to be addressed when discussing national strategy. First, the importance of developing a national security strategy must be realized. Then, there is a need to discuss why strategy is an important precursor to defining military roles and missions. The speaker also stressed the importance of deciding whose voice should be heard in the formulation of national security strategy, and whether government should consult with civil society. Another objective is to define the roles and missions of the security-sector agencies. Finally, he discussed what percentage of the defense force should be dedicated to secondary roles, and how that work should fit into the state's security strategy.

The presenter moved on to some basic questions on defining strategy. He looked to many philosophers from the past, including Clausewitz, to help define what strategy was and what its implications for national security policy are. The presenter also stated that strategy exists both at the abstract and the concrete levels. At the abstract level, there are strategic philosophers and theoreticians, and at the concrete level, there are practical planners. However, the speaker stressed that these levels are interrelated.

The speaker also stated that there are many different spheres, which need to be incorporated into the national strategy. He defined national strategy as the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces during peace and war, to further national interests, priorities, and policies. In this lecture, the presenter focused specifically on the military strategy of the nation. According to the speaker, the military strategy is the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.

Strategy consists of objectives, ways, and means. It covers what a state should do and how it should be done. Military strategy is the combination of military objectives, military concepts, and military resources to achieve national security objectives. The presenter then asked about military objectives. He argued that the military objective is only the means to a political end. Hence, the military objective should be governed by the political objective. Some examples of military objectives for the Botswana Defense Force are to secure Botswana's borders, territorial integrity, protect the Batswana citizens, and secure vital installations. With the situation in Botswana, three crucial aspects must be understood. First, there is a need to scrutinize the manifestos of the various political parties. Second, the focus must be on the vision that Botswana wishes to realize by the year 2016. Third, it is imperative to examine the annual budget.

Finally, it is important to strengthen the capabilities of police forces so that they can meaningfully execute their primary role, but this cannot be done at the expense of the national defense force. It is important to remember that the police and the military are not interchangeable. In other words, a review of the national security strategy should not be a cost-cutting exercise, but should flow from analysis of a country's security and defense needs as a total package.

Police in Botswana

During a plenary session, the speaker discussed the role of human rights in the context of policing in Botswana. He began by stating that it is impossible to have proper law enforcement without human rights. The challenge for police is that the expectations are high, and they are required to produce positive results. When considering the role of human rights in policing in Botswana, there are three areas that must be highlighted: the sources of human rights law in Botswana, potential for abuse in the state, and the enforcement of human rights by the state.

The sources of human rights law in Botswana stem from its written constitution, in which human rights are entrenched. The constitution protects the right to life, right to personal liberty, protection from slavery, and many other provisions. These provisions are meant to be preemptive. They also uphold the rule of law and international law. Botswana has always been a responsible member of the UN. It has also tried to incorporate the UN charter into the Botswana constitution.

The speaker continued by highlighting some of the areas of abuse in Botswana, which the police force is working to improve. When discussing human-rights law, he observed that there are a number of rights that are deemed fundamental. However, sometimes those rights are abused, particularly in the areas where police undertake investigations, interrogations, arrest, search, and detention. Even in Botswana, a country with respect for the rule of law, there have been a few cases of unacceptable behavior. There is a need for the police to create a culture of respect for the rights of those detained in order to ensure the upholding of human rights.

With respect to enforcement of human rights, the presenter stated that it was necessary for human rights to be enforceable so that they are properly upheld. Additionally, the police must focus on the victim's need to have recourse under the law. In Botswana, the police forces mission statement is inclined toward human rights. Human rights activists who once were viewed with suspicion are now given respect. The issue is no longer whether to cooperate with them, but how to build better relations. The highest priority for the police is protecting the human rights of all Batswana.

Panel Discussion on the Challenges of HIV/AIDS

The first presenter discussed the aggressive response the government of Botswana has taken to address HIV/AIDS in the military. The government of Botswana has chosen to target the military, because it is more at risk than the general population. The presenter went on to explain that the military's social network and its culture tend to put soldiers at risk. The government of Botswana has recognized these factors and has developed programs to deal with such challenges. One hundred twenty peer educators and 30 counselors have been trained, and there is free condom distribution and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs).

The second presenter discussed the impact of HIV/AIDS on civil-military relations and military morale in Zambia. Twenty-five percent of Zambia's 9.1 million population is estimated to be seropositive. The speaker stated that while the focus has been on the civilian population, no epidemiological studies have been done to show the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS in soldiers. The speaker stressed the need for more studies to be conducted on the military population in Zambia. The loss of trained manpower has had a great impact on the defense forces, where a great deal of financial resources is invested in training. The speaker estimated that it costs approximately \$52,000 (US) to train one pilot. The Zambian defense forces have lost substantial numbers of personnel as a result of the AIDS epidemic. The speaker also stressed that AIDS has compromised the combat readiness of the defense forces. The defense medical services are unable to cover the cost of care of AIDS patients, most of whom have prolonged and recurrent admissions to hospitals. It was added that the defense force has lost a lot of money in funeral expenses for both military personnel and their family members. The speaker added that the morale of military personnel has been negatively impacted by the AIDS epidemic. Weak and sick soldiers cannot be expected to have high morale. Not only is the morale of the sick man low, but also that of his colleagues. The government of Zambia has implemented a health education program for all personnel at the entry of service. The defense forces have established a department of HIV/AIDS prevention with a coordinator who is responsible for coordination of HIV/AIDS-related activities. To its credit, the defense force has embarked on natural remedies and alternative therapy because of exorbitant prices for retroviral therapy.

The last panelist, an HIV-positive military officer, argued that it is possible to live with the disease. The speaker stressed the importance of learning more about the disease, sharing personal concerns, and seeking psychosocial support. The speaker also applauded the efforts of the Ugandan Services for the Empowerment of Soldiers' Wives. This initiative empowers soldiers' wives in the fight, prevention, care, and control of the spread of HIV/AIDS/STDs in the Ugandan Defense Forces and to improve their family welfare. The speaker emphasized the need for more family planning services, medical consultation, and income-generating activities.

Oversight, Accountability and Public Debate

This session was convened to provide participants with the opportunity to hear from a highly distinguished panel of representatives from the NGO community on vital components of the democratic process. Regrettably, this important session occurred too late in the schedule to be covered in this summary.

Capstone Exercise Module

The Capstone Exercise was the fourth and last academic module of the curriculum. In this two-day exercise, participants had the opportunity to apply and test the ideas and techniques raised and discussed during the previous two week in a simulation exercise environment.

The exercise consisted of a fictional scenario drawing upon a compilation of socioeconomic, geographical, and political realities affecting a variety of countries on the African continent. The fictional state of Capstésie, a medium-sized country undergoing a process of democratization, was the focal point of the exercise. The Capstone Exercise was a role-playing exercise where participants were assigned specific duties within a framework reflecting the state of affairs of a country in the midst of its democratic transition.

Participants were required to look beyond the notional situation presented to them (in which clear threats existed) and to consider common political objectives, including the creation of a regional security and defense initiative. Participants could also review ways of shaping a productive rapprochement on regional integration and security issues. Specifically, participants were required to develop three key aspects of Capstésie's security policy, namely:

- 1. A listing of threats and interests, and the policies required to formulate Capstésie's National Security Strategy;
- 2. The objectives for Capstésie's National Military Strategy;
- 3. A force structure with its associated roles and budget.

Two discussion groups constituted a single forum of approximately 30 participants; each of the four resulting fora conducted the exercise simultaneously. Each forum set its own internal rules in accordance with provided guidelines. The appointed Heads of State and Interagency Committees prepared the forum's presentation for delivery during the final plenary session. During the final plenary session, each of the fora presented its findings and conclusions.

The participants entered into the role-playing aspect of the exercise with enthusiasm, and the discussions were not only lively, but directly incorporated current prevailing political issues pertinent within the African context. The exercise was realistic in that participants found themselves limited by financial constraints and security concerns, and often had to make difficult choices and come to compromises in the creation of their national policy.

Following the seminar, the participants on the whole expressed the view that the exercise was a positive experience that had consolidated the lessons of the previous weeks.

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